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Introduction

Inspired by Coleman (1988), there has been an increasing awareness of the importance of
“social capital” in the recent economic literature. As reflected in the title of his seminal
contribution, Coleman particularly emphasizes that social capital greatly aﬀects individuals’
human capital formation. Along this line of research, the current paper analyzes an important and largely ignored form of social capital in the creation of human capital: religion.1
This paper attempts to achieve two purposes: First, it provides a model of religious participation that adds to the economic literature of religion. Second, it complements the existing
human capital models based on social interactions by analyzing a framework in which social
capital (e.g. religion) aﬀects children’s educational attainment.
This paper links religion to education, and posits that individuals participate in religious
activities not only because of their religious beliefs but also because religion is conducive to
their children’s human capital formation. There is substantial evidence showing that religion
has a significant positive impact on children’s educational attainment and future earnings.2
Also, sociologists’ extensive research indicates that youth raised in religious homes are less
likely to engage in criminal activity, use drugs or alcohol, etc..3 Indeed, many religions
emphasize hard work, honesty, seriousness, and responsibility, all of which are conducive to
children’s acquisition of cognitive and non-cognitive skills.4 In response, parents’ religious
participations are often aﬀected by the concern for their children’s cognitive and moral
development. For example, in his influential writing of the sociology of religion, Wilson
(1978, pp.262-263) notes that
“....Religious training is something that all but two percent of American parents
1
Religion has long been and continues to be a very important social and economic phenomenon. For
example, religious contributions account for about half of the philanthropic giving in the United States. Of
American adults, 90 percent claim to have a religion, and more than 60 percent are formal members of a
church or synagogue (Iannaccone, 1998).
2
For example, see Evans and Schwab (1995), Neal (1997), Vella (1999), and Ewing (2000).
3
See, for example, the survey by Iannaccone (1998).
4
For example, see the reviews of Landes (2000) and Rosser et al. (1999) on the virtues of some religions
and traditions.
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feel they should give their children.... (Parents) see (the church) as a place
of character building for their children.... Children are frequently the most
important consideration in choosing a particular church.... Couples with growing
children have the highest rate of church attendance.”
Further, as shown by sociologists and psychologists’ research, parents’ religious participation is essential for their children’s religious training.5 For example, Nock (1992, p.333)
summarizes:
“....American parents believe it important that their children receive moral and
ethical guidelines from their church. This is why church attendance is highest
among parents with young children....children are much more responsive to the
behavioral models than to instruction. They are much more likely to imitate
what they see parents and others do than what they hear parents and others
say....”
Based on the above observations and analyses, I construct a model in which an individual’s religious participation is due to the concern for her children’s human capital formation
as well as her religious beliefs. In this model, an individual’s human capital is jointly determined by her family background and her social capital. Specifically, an individual’s family
background is represented by her parental human capital, and her social capital is measured by her religious capital. Meanwhile, a household’s religious activities enhance the
social capital for the children’s education. In a related paper, Weinberg (2001) analyzes a
model in which parents use external incentives, such as pecuniary rewards and/or corporal
punishment, to induce their children to exert eﬀorts in human capital accumulation. In
a similar vein, this paper suggests that religious education constitutes a kind of internal
5

Barro and McCleary (2002) also note (page 6): “.... the incentive to bring children to church tends to
induce greater church attendance of adults, who are likely to want to participate in the process of inculcating
their children.”
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enforcement mechanism for children to learn to follow moral rules and exert eﬀort in study.6
In an overlapping generations framework, this model generates several interesting implications. First, it investigates how individuals’ religious participations are endogenously
determined in a framework where parental human capital and social capital interact in the
creation of human capital. The model implies that there is a close relationship between an
individual’s educational attainment and the level of her religious participation. Moreover,
it helps explain an important stylized fact about education and religion revealed by Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) that in the United States, while religious attendance rises sharply
with education across individuals, it declines sharply with education across denominations.
Sacerdote and Glaeser explains this phenomenon as that education both increases the returns to social connection and reduces the extent of religious belief. This model provides
an alternative explanation, by showing that the result that is consistent with this stylized
fact can be obtained if parental human capital and social capital are substitutes in a child’s
human capital formation.
Next, in a dynamic setting, this paper analyzes the long-run equilibria of individuals’
human capital and religious activities. Under some reasonable assumptions, the model
shows that there exists a steady state, in which individuals allocate a positive amount of
time and resources to religious activities. Thus, the model helps explain why seemingly
unproductive religions can perpetuate. In the received literature, Bisin and Verdier (1998,
2000) demonstrate that cultural and religious traits can be transmitted from one generation
to the next because of parents’ “imperfect empathy.” Cozzi (1998) explains the perpetuation
of culture and religion as a bubble phenomenon. This paper complements the existing
literature by providing a model in which religion is everlasting because of intergenerational
altruism and the value of religious/cultural capital in children’s human capital formation.
6

In fact, as stressed by Smith (1776), one of the most economically significant functions of religious
belief is to provide strong incentives to follow moral structures. Smith explains that religion eﬀectively
supplements the enforcement eﬀorts of secular authorities and complements the other incentives that cause
individuals to control their own behavior. (See Anderson (1988) for a comprehensive survey on Smith’s
writings on the economics of religion.)
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In what follows, Section 2 provides a brief review of some related theoretical literature.
Section 3 establishes the basic analytic framework. Section 4 investigates how individuals’
religious participation is endogenously determined. Section 5 analyzes the long-run equilibria of the dynamics of individuals’ human capital and religious activities. Section 6 oﬀers
the conclusion.

2

Theoretical Antecedents

Firstly, this paper is related to the economic literature of religion. In recent decades, some
important contributions have been made in modelling religion and religious behaviors. Azzi
and Ehrenberg (1975) analyze a model of church attendance and contributions, in which
individuals allocate their time and money among religious and secular commodities to maximize lifetime and afterlife utility. Iannaccone (1990) applies Stigler and Becker’s (1977)
idea of “consumption capital” to explain rational habit formation in religious activities. In
this framework, current religious participation increases an individual’s stock of “religious
human capital” and thereby increases the individual’s utility from future participation. Iannaccone (1992) presents a model that accounts for the continuing success of groups with
strict requirements. In particular, the model shows that eﬃcient religions with perfectly
rational members may benefit from stigma, self-sacrifice and bizarre behavioral restrictions
because deviant norms mitigate the free-rider problems faced by religious groups. Bisin and
Verdier (2000) extend the study of religion into an intergenerational framework. Assuming
that parents get more utility if the children adopt their religion, Bisin and Verdier present
an economic analysis of the intergenerational transmission of religious traits through family
socialization and marital segregation. Barros and Garoupa (2002) introduce spatial location
models into the economics of religion. Dehejia et al. (2005) show that involvement with
religious organizations insures an individual’s stream of consumption and of happiness.
Secondly, this paper is also related to the human capital models based on social interactions.7
7

For the extensive surveys of this literature, see Becker and Murphy (2000) and Brock and Durlauf
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For example, Borjas (1992) and Lundberg and Startz (1998) analyze models in which an
individual’s human capital is determined by the average level of human capital of the ethnic
group to which she belongs as well as her own parental human capital.8 Benabou (1993) suggests that the neighborhoods with a high level of average parental human capital facilitates
one’s human capital formation. He shows that neighborhoods are formed endogenously and
in equilibrium, higher income people live in the communities whose rent and average level of
human capital are both higher. Epple and Romano (1998) and Brock and Durlauf (2001b)
posit that a student’s academic achievement is determined by both her own ability/eﬀort
and mean ability/eﬀort of her classmates. Epple and Romano show that in equilibrium,
parents who have high income and high-ability children pay high tuition to send their children to private schools in which there is better peer-group externality than public schools.
In summary, the existing literature implies that an individual’s social capital is either exogenous or is essentially “purchased” by her parents. This paper extends the existing literature
by suggesting that the main cost of obtaining some kinds of social capital, such as religious
capital, is parents’ time (of religious participation), that is, parents’ opportunity cost. Indeed, as suggested by Iannaccone (1988, 1992), religious/cultural capital can be regarded
as a “quasi-public good.” Like a public good, it does not exclude any individual. Unlike a
true public good, however, it is limited to the participants of religious activities.

3
3.1

The Analytic Framework
Preferences

Individuals operate in a two period overlapping generations world. Every individual belongs
to a family, where she is a child in her first period and becomes a parent in her second
period. Each family has one parent and one child, and the parent is the decision maker of
(2001a).
8
In a broader sense, Lucas (1988) and Galor and Tsiddon (1996) study a human capital formation
function in which the inputs are one’s parental human capital and the average level of human capital of the
whole society.
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a household.
A parent cares about her household’s current consumption and her child’s future earnings. Also, she may obtain utility or disutility from participating in religious activities. The
utility function of a parent of generation t is defined as
ln(Ct ) + η ln(Yt+1 ) + θαt

(1)

where Ct , Yt+1 , and αt denote the household’s consumption, the child’s future wage and
the fraction of the parent’s time devoted to religious participation respectively. η and θ are
constant parameters. η (η > 0) measures the relative weight between a parent’s concern for
her child’s future income and that for her family’s current consumption.
θ measures an individual’s taste for participating in religious activities per se. The
greater θ is, the more utility one gets from religious participation. (Note that θ can be
either positive or negative or zero.) An individual’s value of θ may depend on many factors,
such as the degree to which she believes in God, her “afterlife consumption motive” (Azzi
and Ehrenberg), and the desire for social interactions (Iannaccone, 1992; Sacerdote and
Glaeser).
Yt is the total earnings when a parent devotes all of her time working. If one allocates αt
fraction of her time in religious activities, her net earnings become (1−αt )Yt .9 For simplicity,
there are no bequests of wealth in this model. Thus, the consumption of a household is
equal to the parent’s net earnings. Namely,
Ct = (1 − αt )Yt

3.2

(2)

Human Capital Formation

An individual’s parental human capital and social capital are both important in her human
capital formation. The importance of parental human capital on an individual’s educational
9

This assumption is consistent with the empirical finding by Lipford and Tollison (2003). Barro and
McCleary also emphasize opportunity costs as the main costs of religious participations.
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attainment is consistently confirmed in numerous empirical studies.10 Also, as discussed in
the introduction, the social capital exposed to a child aﬀects her motivation and eﬀort
at study, etc., and hence influences her human capital formation. In this model, the social capital exposed to a child, S, is represented by the religious capital. Meanwhile, the
amount of the religious capital that is exposed to a child depends on her parents’ religious
participation. Thus, I define
S = g(α)
and I assume
g 0 (α) > 0, g 00 (α) < 0

(3)

Let Ht denote the level of human capital of an individual of generation t, and the human
capital production function is defined as follows,
Ht+1 = h(Ht , St ) = h(Ht , g(αt ))

(4)

The production function of human capital is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly
concave with respect to its variables, that is,
h1 (H, S) > 0, h2 (H, S) > 0, h11 (H, S) < 0, h22 (H, S) < 0

3.3

(5)

Production

In this economy, there is a single good that can be produced by two constant returns to
scale technologies. One is “modern” production technology, which is human capital (or
skilled labor) intensive; the other is “traditional” production technology, which is physical
(or unskilled) labor intensive. To present the model in the simplest way, I follow Galor
and Zeira (1993), Hazan and Berdugo (2002), Fan (2003), among others by assuming that
10

In fact, much empirical research seems to suggest that the eﬀect of parental education on children’s
education is much greater than that of parental expenditure on children’s education in developed countries.
For example, based on his exhaustive survey of the existing literature, Hanushek (1996, p.16) concludes that
“schools (i.e. expenditure on children’s schooling) seemed relatively unimportant in determining student
achievement, while families were the key element of student success.”
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the only input in the modern (skilled) sector is human capital (or mental labor, simply
speaking), while the only input in the traditional (unskilled) sector is physical labor.
This simple assumption is, in fact, very intuitive. For example, for professors and doctors, their productivity is determined by their human capital (knowledge and skills); for
janitors and porters, their productivity is mainly determined by their raw labor, but is
little aﬀected by their academic performance. This assumption is also supported by some
formal empirical studies. For example, Bishop (1990) shows that achievement in science,
mathematical reasoning, reading, and vocabulary has almost no eﬀect during the decade
following graduation on the wage rates and earnings of those not going to college. However,
it should be noted that the purpose of this assumption is only for technical simplicity. It is
both intuitive and easy to verify that we can obtain similar results as long as we maintain
that human capital is used more intensively in the skilled sector.
Specifically, the production function of the “modern” technology is described by:
Yts = Lst

(6)

where Yts and Lst are the output and the total human capital input in this sector at time t,
respectively. The production function of the “traditional” technology is described by:
Ytn = wu Lnt

(7)

where Ytn and Lnt are the output and the total unskilled labor force in this sector at time t,
respectively.
The above two production technologies are available to every individual. However, an
individual has to choose to work either as a skilled or an unskilled worker, but not both.
Every individual is assumed to be endowed with one unit physical labor in her second period
(regardless of the level of her educational attainment), while the amount of human capital
that an individual has in her second period is entirely acquired in her first period. From
(6) and (7), one can see that since the economy is perfectly competitive, the wage rate for
human capital in the “modern” sector and the wage rate for raw labor in the “traditional”
8

sector are 1 and wu , respectively. Thus, if an individual acquires Ht amount of human
capital in her first period, then her earnings will be
Yt =

4

(

Ht
wu

if she becomes a skilled worker
if she becomes an unskilled worker

(8)

Religious Participation and Children’s Education

This section analyzes how individuals’ religious participation is endogenously determined.
It shows that an individual’s educational attainment plays a critical role in the level of her
religious participation, her child’s human capital formation, and her occupational choice.

4.1

Religious Participation and Children’s Occupation Choice

First, the following analysis shows that parents’ religious participation depends on children’s
occupational choices.
Case 1: Children will be unskilled
If the child will be unskilled, as described in Section 3.3, Yt+1 = wu . Thus, a parent’s
utility function is
U u ≡ ln((1 − αt )Yt ) + η ln(wu ) + θαt

(9)

In this case, clearly, the parent’s choice on religious participation is only determined by her
taste for religion, θ.11 Maximizing (9) subject to αt ≥ 0, I get the first order condition as
−

1
+θ ≤0
1 − αt

(10)

(10) holds with strict equality if αt > 0. I denote the solution to (10) by αu , then
u

α =

(

0
θ−1
θ

11

if θ < 1
if θ ≥ 1

(11)

For simplicity, the model abstracts from the consideration that religious beliefs can reduce the likelihood
of children’s undesirable behaviors (e.g. criminal activities, premature pregnancy). If the model were
extended to take into account this issue, it would get the conclusion that the concern for children will lead
all parents to participate more in religious activities no matter whether their children will be skilled or
unskilled. However, as will be clear, this consideration will not change the results of the paper qualitatively.

9

From (11), one can see that when an individual is not concerned about her child’s
education, she will not participate in any religious activities if she does not have strong
religious beliefs (i.e. θ < 1).
When θ ≥ 1,
d(

θ−1
1
)= 2 >0
θ
θ

Thus, αu is a strictly increasing function of θ when θ ≥ 1. For example, it is often observed
that people participate in more religious activities when their beliefs get stronger.
Case 2: Children will be skilled
In this case, from (8), Yt+1 = Ht+1 = h(Ht , g(α)), and a parent’s utility function is
U s ≡ ln((1 − αt )Yt ) + η ln(h(Ht , g(αt ))) + θαt

(12)

The first order condition is
−

1
ηh2 g 0
≤0
+θ+
1 − αt
h

(13)

with strict equality holds if αt > 0. I denote the solution to (13) by αts .12 Then, comparing
(10) and (13), I obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For a parent with any given level of human capital,
αts ≥ αu
αts > αu

if θ < 1
if θ ≥ 1

Proof. First, when θ < 1, αu = 0. Because the time of religious participation cannot be
negative, obviously, αts ≥ 0 = αu .
Second, when θ ≥ 1, (10) holds with strict equality, that is
1
=θ
1 − αu

(14)

1
ηh2 g 0
>θ
≥
θ
+
1 − αts
h

(15)

Meanwhile, (13) implies

12
I note that αst is a function of Ht . But for the time being I do not write it explicitly here in order to
save space.
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(14) & (15) imply
1
1
>
s
1 − αt
1 − αu

which implies

αts > αu

This lemma implies that parents tend to participate in more religious activities if they
are concerned about their children’s human capital formation. Moreover, from the above
proof, it is easy to see that the diﬀerence between αts and αu tends to increase as the marginal
benefit of religious participation, g0 (α), increases.
At this point, note that if we relax an assumption in Section 3.3 by assuming that
the inputs of the unskilled sector include both human capital and physical labor, it can
be verified that similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can still get the result “αts > αu ”
if “αu > 0”, that is, parents whose children will be skilled tend to participate more in
religious activities.13 In other words, Lemma 1 will still materially hold under the relaxed
assumption. Therefore, the simplifying assumption made in Section 3.3 significantly reduces
the algebra without any loss of generality.
Occupational Choice
From (8), clearly, an individual will choose to be skilled in her second period if and only
if
Ht+1 ≥ wu
Now, I define H h as satisfying
h(H h , g(αu )) = wu
Then, for all Ht > H h ,
Ht+1 = h(Ht , g(αt )) > h(H h , g(αu )) = wu
13

In this case, however, αu is also aﬀected by the concern for children’s human capital formation.
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Thus, an individual will choose to be skilled if her parental human capital is greater than
H h.
If Ht < H h , a child’s occupational choice may depend on her parent’s religious participation. A parent will prefer that her child will be skilled if and only if
Us ≥ Uu
I define
∆U ≡ U s − U u
= ln((1 − αts )Yt ) + η ln(h(Ht , g(αts ))) + θαts − ln((1 − αu )Yt ) − η ln(wu ) − θαu
= ln((1 − αts )) + η ln(h(Ht , g(αts ))) + θαts − ln((1 − αu )) − η ln(wu ) − θαu
Then, no matter whether the parent is skilled or unskilled, by the envelop theorem, we have
ηh1
d(∆U)
>0
=
dHt
h

(16)

Thus, there exists a unique H c ∈ [0, H h ) such that U s ≥ U n if and only if Ht ≥ H c . In
summary, the following lemma is obtained.
Lemma 2: There exists a critical value, H c , such that a child will become skilled if and
only if her parental human capital is greater or equal to H c .
It should be noted that the model abstracts from the consideration of some factors that
may aﬀect an individual’s educational attainment. For example, if some individuals with
low parental human capital are endowed with high innate ability, or if some individuals with
high parental human capital are endowed with low innate ability, we will observe that some
individuals with low parental human capital will become skilled, while some others with
high parental human capital become unskilled. However, even if these factors are taken
into account, the essence of Lemma 2 will remain that children whose parents are better
educated are more likely to be skilled.
12

4.2

Education and Religion

The above analysis shows that the level of an individual’s religious participation is a function
of her human capital. Thus, I define an individual’s optimal choice of the level of her religious
participation as
α(Ht )
Then, from Lemmas 1 & 2, we have the following result.
Proposition 1:
if Ht < H c
α(Ht ) = αu
α(Ht ) ≥ αu (with strict inequality holds if θ ≥ 1) if Ht ≥ H c
Proposition 1 means that there is a threshold level of human capital, such that the
individuals whose human capital is below the threshold level tend to participate less in
religious activities. The intuition of this proposition is straightforward: If an individual’s
human capital is low, her child will likely work in an occupation in which raw labor is
intensively used and human capital acquired through formal education is not intensively
used. Consequently, her decision on religious participation will be little aﬀected by the
concern for her child’s education. Therefore, ceteris paribus, an individual’s level of religious
participation is higher if her human capital is above a certain threshold level so that her
child will likely be skilled. Proposition 1 is consistent with a stylized fact about education
and religion in the United States, that is, education is the most statistically important factor
explaining church attendance, and religious attendance rises sharply with education across
individuals (Iannaccone, 1998; Sacerdote and Glaeser).
The following analysis will examine the relationship between education and religious
activities for those whose human capital is above the threshold level, H c . For simplicity, I
only consider the case when the optimal solution is interior so that (13) holds with strict
equality. Totally diﬀerentiating (13) with respect to αt and Ht and rearranging, I get
[−

η
ηg0
1
0 2
00
0 2
+
(hh
(g
)
+
hh
g
−
(h
g
)
)]dα
+
(hh12 − h1 h2 )dHt = 0
22
2
2
t
(1 − αt )2 h2
h2
13

(17)

I define
A≡−

1
η
+ 2 [hh22 (g0 )2 + hh2 g 00 − (h2 g 0 )2 ]
2
(1 − αt )
h

(18)

Clearly A < 0. Then, from (17), I get

dαt
ηg0
=
(h1 h2 − hh12 )
dHt
Ah2

(19)

From (19), the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 2: When Ht ≥ H c , the level of an individual’s religious participation decreases
with her human capital (i.e.

dαt
dHt

< 0) if and only if
h12 <

h1 h2
h

(20)

From (20), one can see that Proposition 2 implies that an individual’s religious participation is negatively correlated with her education level if
h12 ≤ 0

(21)

When (21) is satisfied, it can be interpreted as that social capital and parental human capital
are substitutes in creating children’s human capital. In this case, when Ht ≥ H c , individuals
with higher levels of human capital and wage rate will have less incentive to participate in
religious activities, because they have higher opportunity cost of religious participation and
their religious activities are less eﬃcient in enhancing their children’s human capital due
to the substitution eﬀect between parental human capital and social capital in children’s
education.
Moreover, when (20) is satisfied, the combination of Propositions 1 and 2 has the following implication. Proposition 1 implies that better educated individuals are more likely
to participate in religious activities; Proposition 2 indicates that the frequency of an individual’s religious participation may decrease with her educational attainment. Meanwhile,
Iannaccone (1992) demonstrates that in an eﬃcient market of religions, individuals are usually sorted into diﬀerent denominations according to their intensity of participation. In
14

other words, individuals belonging to the same denomination tend to have similar levels of
religious attendance. Therefore, based on Iannaccone (1992), the combination of Propositions 1 & 2 provides an explanation for an important stylized fact about education and
religion in the United States recently revealed by Sacerdote and Glaeser: while religious attendance rises sharply with education across individuals, it declines sharply with education
across denominations.
Finally, note that if social capital and parental human capital are complements in creating children’s human capital, and the complementary eﬀect is suﬃciently strong such that
(20) is violated, individuals with a higher level of human capital and wage rate will participate in more religious activities. However, it should be pointed out that there is little
empirical research on the interactions between social capital and other factors (e.g. family
background) in an individual’s human capital formation function. This theoretical analysis
illustrates the importance for such an empirical endeavor in future research.
The following example helps illustrate the above proposition and assumptions.
Example 1: Suppose that the human capital production function takes the following
form,
1

Ht+1 = h(Ht , St ) = B(Htσ + Stσ ) σ

(22)

where B and σ are positive coeﬃcients.
From (22), we have,
1

h1 = BHtσ−1 (Htσ + Stσ ) σ −1
1

h2 = BStσ−1 (Htσ + Stσ ) σ −1
1

h12 = B(1 − σ)Htσ−1 Stσ−1 (Htσ + Stσ ) σ −2
Clearly, h12 ≤ 0 if and only if
σ≥1
15

Also, if σ < 1, hh12 < h1 h2 if and only if
1

1

B 2 (1 − σ)Htσ−1 Stσ−1 (Htσ + Stσ )2( σ −1) < B 2 Htσ−1 Stσ−1 (Htσ + Stσ )2( σ −1)
namely
σ>0
Thus, in this example, noting Proposition 2, we always have

dαt
dHt

< 0 when Ht > H c .

Moreover, the relationship between the level of an individual’s religious participation
and her education level can be illustrated by the following diagram.
Insert Figure 1 here
The above figure illustrates the relationship between an individual’s religious participation and her education level. An individual’s level of religious participation is constant at a
relatively low level when Ht < H c . When Ht > H c , an individual’s religious participation
is higher than that when Ht < H c , but it decreases with her education level in this domain
of Ht .

5

Long-Run Equilibrium

This section analyzes the long run equilibria of the dynamics of individuals’ religious activities and human capital. First, the steady states of the level of religious participation and
human capital of a dynasty are defined as follows.
αt = αt+1 = αt+2 = .....
Ht = Ht+1 = Ht+2 = .....
In this section, I focus on the study of the households whose children become skilled.
Note that for the individuals whose children become unskilled, their religious activities in
both long run and short run is simply determined by θ in equation (11). Thus, what is more
interesting is the case of skilled dynasties, whose level of religious participation is influenced
16

by the concern of the social capital for their children’s human capital formation. First, I
state and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3: (1) If the following conditions are satisfied,
lim h1 (H, S) = 0

H→∞

h(H c , g(αu )) > H c

(23)
(24)

then there exists a steady state in which individuals are skilled.
dHt+1
dHt

(2) If, in addition,

> 0 at the steady states, then at least one of the steady states

is stable.
Proof.

(1) By Lemma 2, an individual will be skilled if and only if her parental human

capital, Ht. , is greater than H c . If (24) is satisfied, her human capital, Ht+1 , will be
Ht+1 = h(Ht , g(αs (Ht ))) > h(H c , g(αu )) > H c
Thus, her child will also be skilled, and so will all of her future generations.
Also, from (23) and using l’Hospital’s rule, we know
h(H, S)
= lim h1 (H, S) = 0
H→∞
H→∞
H
lim

Thus, there exists a H f , which is suﬃciently large, so that
h(H f , g(αs )) < H f
In other words, at Ht = H f , we have Ht+1 < Ht . Meanwhile, (24) implies that at Ht = H c ,
we have Ht+1 > Ht . Thus, the locus of the dynamics of individuals’ human capital must
cross the 45-degree line between Ht = H c and Ht = H f at least once. In other words, there
must be at least one steady state.
Moreover, since αts is a function of Ht only, when Ht reaches a steady state, αts also
reaches a steady state.
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(2) Note that at the first intersection between the locus of the dynamics of individuals’
human capital and the 45-degree line, the locus crosses the 45-degree line from above. So,
if, in addition,

dHt+1
dHt

> 0 at the steady state, then the slope of the locus at that intersection

point must be less than one and greater than zero, which implies that the steady state is
stable.
Let αs and H s denote a steady state level of religious participation and human capital
of the skilled dynasties. In the following, I will show under what conditions, αs > 0. This
goal can be achieved by demonstrating the conditions for that “αs = 0” cannot satisfy the
first order condition.
If αs = 0, the first order condition (13) becomes
−1 + θ +

ηh2 (H s , g(0))g 0 (0)
≤0
h(H s , g(0))

(25)

Meanwhile, that H s is the steady state level of human capital implies
H s = h(H s , g(0))

(26)

Plugging (26) into (25), I get
−1 + θ +

ηh2 (H s , g(0))g 0 (0)
≤0
Hs

namely
g0 (0)h2 ≤

H s (1 − θ)
η

(27)

Clearly, (25) or (27) will not be satisfied if g 0 (0) and h2 are suﬃciently large. In other words,
if g0 (0) and h2 are suﬃciently large, αs = 0 cannot be the optimal solution in the steady
state. Thus, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 3: At the steady state, for any θ,
αs > 0
if g 0 (0) and h2 (Ht , g(0)) are suﬃciently large.
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This proposition shows that even if θ becomes very small or negative, that is, individuals
obtain no utility or negative utility from religious participation, religion can still perpetuate
due to its positive role in children’s human capital formation. Thus, the model provides an
explanation for why many religions can persist in the long run, despite that the advance of
science and technology may make many people become less religious and more skeptical of
faith-based claims. Moreover, this result has interesting growth implications since human
capital is a crucial determinant of economic development.14
In the existing literature, Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2000) examine the models in which
parents get more utility if their children adopt their religion/culture. They demonstrate that
cultural and religious traits can be transmitted from one generation to the next because
of parents’ imperfect empathy. Cozzi provides a model in which culture and religion is
a bubble. He shows that culture and religion can perpetuate because individuals have
incentives to purchase it due to the self-fulfilling expectation of an ever-increasing price of
this immaterial asset over its market fundamental. This paper complements the existing
literature by providing a model in which religion is everlasting because of intergenerational
altruism and the value of religious/cultural capital in children’s human capital formation.

6

Conclusion

This paper attempts to achieve two purposes by linking religion and education. First, it
provides an alternative model of religious participation that adds to the economic literature
of religion. Second, it complements the human capital models based on social interactions by
analyzing a framework in which social capital, such as religion, aﬀects children’s education,
a la Coleman. Based on sociologists’ research as well as the existing economic literature,
I build a model in which people’s religious participation are determined by the concern
for their children’s human capital accumulation as well as their religious beliefs. Because
religious capital is conducive to children’s education and moral development, a household’s
14
For example, Guiso et al. (2003) show that religious beliefs are associated with the economic attitudes
that are conducive to higher per capita income and growth.
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religious participation not only increases its members’ utility from religious pursuit per se
but also enhances the social capital for the creation of the children’s human capital. In
other words, religion has a value of investment (in children’s human capital) as well as a
value of consumption.
In an overlapping generations framework, this model generates several interesting implications. It suggests that there is a close relationship between an individual’s education
attainment and the level of her religious participation. Moreover, by assuming that parental
human capital and social capital are substitutes in a child’s human capital formation, the
model provides an explanation for an important stylized fact revealed by Sacerdote and
Glaeser (2001) that in the United States, while religious attendance rises sharply with education across individuals, it declines sharply with education across denominations. Further,
this paper analyzes the long-run equilibrium of individuals’ human capital and religious
activities, which helps explain why seemingly unproductive religions can be everlasting.
In future research, the model can be extended in several ways. For example, for simplicity, this model assumes that parents obtain utility only from children’s human capital and
future income. If we add that parents (particularly at old age) also obtain utility from the
“services” from children, as emphasized by Bernheim et al. (1985), then people would have
more motivation to provide their children with religious education because many religions
emphasize that children should always honor and revere their parents. Also, this paper
can be extended to study endogenous social interactions among diﬀerent households in the
context of endogenous religious/cultural participation.
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Figure 1: The relationship between education and religious participation

